Hastings Environmental Law Journal
Volume 14
Number 1 Winter 2008

Article 25

1-1-2008

Some Thoughts on Comanagement
Eric Smith Hon.

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_environmental_law_journal
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric Smith Hon., Some Thoughts on Comanagement, 14 Hastings West Northwest J. of Envtl. L. & Pol'y
763 (2008)
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_environmental_law_journal/vol14/iss1/25

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Environmental Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Some Thoughts on Comanagement
The Honorable Eric Smith*
1.

Introduction

There has been growing interest in the Alaska Native community in the
idea of "comanagement" both as a means of increasing Native involvement
in and control over hunting and fishing by Alaska Natives, and as a vehicle
for improving overall management of fish and wildlife populations.
Commonly termed "subsistence" in Alaska, the use of fish and wildlife is a
central component of the culture, nutrition and daily life of every Alaska
Native tribe. To date, subsistence hunting and fishing has been almost
totally controlled by federal and state law and regulations-regulations
which impose western concepts of management and fairness on very
different cultural practices. Comanagement is seen as a way of righting this
balance by integrating Native knowledge, practices, and management systems
into the overall management of fish and wildlife, thereby achieving an
enriched and, through vested interest, a better enforced management system.
There is a wealth of literature on comanagement, largely discussing
either the concept of comanagement or particular comanagement
arrangements.' The focus of this article will be to address some of the key

*

Superior Court Judge, Palmer, Alaska. Formerly in private practice (Alaska

Native and environmental issues), Anchorage, AK; J.D., 1979, Yale Law School: B.A.,
1975, Swarthmore College. An earlier version of this article was prepared for the
Rural Alaska Community Action Program (RurAL CAP) and appeared in the RurAL
CAP publications, "Village Voices" and "Comanagement: Establishing Principles,
Policies and Protocols." The author would like to thank RurAL CAP for supporting the
research and writing of this article, and the following people for their invaluable
review and comments on previous drafts: Many Kancewick, Carl Jack, Carol Torsen,
Carl Hild, Caleb Pungowiyi, Larry Merculieff, and Polly Wheeler. The comments in
this article are the personal views of the author.
1. Se e.g., Co-OPERATVE MANAGEMENT OF LOcAL FISHERIES (Evelyn Pinkerton ed., 1989);
TRADmoNAL KNOWLEDGE AND RENEWABLE RESOuRCE MANAGEMENT IN NORTHERN REGIONS (Freeman

&Cabyn eds., 1988); Fikret Berkes et al., Co-management:The Evolution inTheory and Practice of Joint
Administration of Living Resouces, 18 ALTERNATIVES 12 (1991); David S. Case, Subsistence and SelfDetermination:Can Alaska Natives Have a More 'Effective Voice'?, 60 U.COLO. L. REv. 1009 (1989); GAIL
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issues involved in the construction of a comanagement agreement, in the
hope of providing concrete guidance to tribes and government officials alike
as they begin to integrate this relatively new management system into fish
and wildlife management, especially in Alaska.
If.

A Brief Overview of Hunting and Fishing Laws in Alaska

It is difficult to discuss comanagement structures outside of the
particular context in which they arise. The context of this article is hunting
and fishing by Alaska Natives. As such, before turning to the structural
issues which are the focus of this article, it is important to briefly describe
the basic laws currently governing hunting and fishing by Alaska Natives.
The most significant such law is Title VIII of the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act.2 Title VIII creates a priority for "subsistence
uses" of fish and wildlife over all other consumptive uses; subsistence uses
may not be restricted in any way unless and until all other uses are fully
curtailed.' "Subsistence uses," in turn, are defined as
the customary and traditional uses by rural Alaska residents of
wild, renewable resources for direct personal or family
consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, tools or
transportation; for the making and selling of handicraft articles
out of inedible byproducts of fish and wildlife resources taken
for personal or family consumption; for barter or sharing for
personal or family consumption; and for customary trade.4
While the priority applies to "rural residents" of Alaska, and not to Alaska
Natives per se, the priority was adopted in substantial part to protect
subsistence uses by Alaska Natives, ' and most Alaska Natives do benefit
from it since they live in rural Alaska.'

OSHERENKO, SHARING POWER WITH NATIVE USERS: CO-MANAGEMENT REGIMES FOR ARcnc WILDLIFE

(Canadian Arctic Resources Committee Policy Paper No. 5, 1988); PETER USHER, THE DEVOLUTION
OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND THE PROSPECTS FOR WILDLIFE CONSERVATION IN THE NORTHWEST

Resources Committee Policy Paper No. 3,1986).
2. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1994 (hereinafter

TERRrORIES (Canadian Arctic

ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. § 3111-26, Pub. L. No. 96-487.
3.

ANILCA§804, 16 U.S.C. § 3114 (1994).

4.

ANILCA§803, 16 U.S.C. 3113(1994).

5. See ANILCA § 801(1), (4), 16 U.S.C. § 3111(1), (4) (1994). See also 126 CONG.
REC. 29,278-79 (1980) (Statement of Rep. Udall); Village of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d
572, 580 (9th Cir. 1984).
6. The priority also applies only on the "public lands," i.e., lands, waters, and interests
therein title to which is held by the United States. See 16 U.S.C. § 3102(1) (1994). Prior to
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The subsistence priority is implemented through regulations adopted
by the Federal Subsistence Board (the Board), which is composed of a
Chair-currently an Alaska Native hunter-and the regional directors of the
federal land management agencies in Alaska.7 The Board, in turn, is advised
by a set of ten regional councils, whose members are subsistence users
living in rural Alaska.' The councils make recommendations to the Board
concerning
proposed
hunting
and
fishing
regulations-those
recommendations are entitled to great deference, as they may only be
rejected by the Board under relatively limited circumstances.9
ANILCA does not apply to marine mammals or migratory birds. ° Harvest of
marine mammals is governed by the Marine Mammal Protection Act." Section
101(b) of the MMPA 2 authorizes Alaska Natives to take marine mammals for
subsistence or for the making of handicrafts, provided that the take is done in a
non-wasteful manner. Importantly, the federal government may not regulate
Native harvest of marine mammals unless and until it makes a finding that a
particular species or stock is "depleted," at which time the government may adopt
regulations governing the take of that particular species or stock. 3
As a practical matter, the prohibition on federal regulation of Native
harvest of marine mammals has meant that Alaska Natives themselves regulate
the take of marine mammals-they are the "managers" through their own
regulations. Alaska Natives have done so both at the tribal level 4 and through

1990, the laws of the State of Alaska were deemed to be consistent with Title VIII and hence,
pursuant to § 805 of ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3115 (1994), the priority applied on all lands in
Alaska and was administered by the State. However, the Supreme Court of Alaska ruled in
McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d I (Alaska 1985), that the State could not constitutionally provide
a priority only to rural residents. The State thereby fell out of compliance with federal law
and hence lost management authority over subsistence uses on public lands. The State
continues to provide a subsistence priority on state and private lands, ALAsKA STAT. §
16.05.258, but all Alaskans qualify for the priority. Id.
7.

See 50CFR§ 100.10(1995).

8.

See ANILCA § 805(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3115(a) (1994).

9. See ANILCA § 805(c), 16 U.S.C. § 3115(C) (1994). The Board must accept a
regional council recommendation unless it "is not supported by substantial

evidence, violates recognized principles of fish and wildlife conservation, or would be
detrimental to the satisfaction of subsistence needs." id.
10.

SeeANILCA§805(4), 16U.S.C. § 3115(4)(1994).

11. See Marine Mammal Protection Act (hereinafter MMPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 13611421h (1994).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (b)) (1994).
13.

See id.

14. For example, several villages have adopted tribal ordinances governing
marine mammal hunting.
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Native commissions that are formed around particular species of marine
mammals. One of the most well-known of these commissions is the Alaska
Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC), which has signed a cooperative
agreement with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
under which the Inupiat and Yup'ik whaling captains assume principal
responsibility for both regulating whaling by their people and enforcing the
whaling regulations-NOAA essentially serves in a back-up role, assuming
enforcement responsibility when the AEWC indicates that it is unable to do so. 5
The harvest of migratory birds-principally geese and ducks-is an
important part of the subsistence way of life for all Alaska Native cultures.
The 1916 Treaty between the United States and Canada banned this harvest6
during the spring and summer, when most of the birds are in Alaska.1
Alaska Natives nevertheless have continued to take the birds during these
times, because of their nutritional and cultural importance. Recognizing that
it basically was powerless to stop the harvest, 7 the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) decided to work with Alaska Natives to assure that
declining bird species were protected. This led to the landmark YukonKuskokwim Delta Goose Management Plan, under which Yup'ik Eskimos in
western Alaska agreed not to harvest certain, species of birds in exchange for
a promise by FWS that it would not bring enforcement action against
persons taking other species of birds." This again effectively enabled Alaska
Natives to govern their own harvest of most species of migratory birds.
The United States and Canada recently signed a Protocol amending the 1916
Treaty to authorize spring and summer subsistence hunts by Alaska and Canadian
Natives.' 9 The Protocol itself and language accompanying the agreement note the
importance of full involvement by Native peoples in the management of migratory
birds.2" This no doubt will lead to further and more comprehensive agreements
between FWS and Native tribes and tribal organizations.

15.

See Milton Freeman, The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission: Successful Comanagement

under Extreme Conditions,in CO-OPERATIVE MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL FISHERIES, supranote 1.

16. 1916 Convention Between the United Kingdom and the United States of
America for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United States.
17. There has been a long history of Native resistance to efforts by FWS to enforce
the ban on spring and summer hunting. The most famous of these was the "Barrow duckin," when federal agents cited a Native state legislator from Barrow for hunting ducks out
of season. Two days later, 1385 other men from Barrow also shot ducks and showed up
with them at the game warden's office. See OSHERENKO, supra note 1,at 47.
18.

See id. at 33-40.

19. See Protocol Between the Government of California and the Government of
the United States of America Amending the 1916 Convention Between the United
Kingdom and the United States of America for the Protection of Migratory Birds in
Canada and the United States, signed December 14, 1995.
20.

See id.; Protocol Interpretation of U.S. Delegation.
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The agreements between NOAA and the AEWC, and between the FWS
and the Yup'ik Eskimos, are often cited as examples of "comanagement.""
This article turns now to a brief discussion of the concept of comanagement,
and then discusses a variety of implementation issues.
Ili.

The Concept of Comanagement
A.

The Sharing of Responsibility

The term "comanagement" generally refers to the sharing of
responsibility for management functions by indigenous people and the
government. 2 There are many ways to strike the balance of power and
responsibility. Government control over management decisions, with
limited input from indigenous peoples, marks one end of the spectrum.
Indigenous control, with input from the government, marks the other end.
Between these two poles are virtually endless possibilities for shared
decision-making authority.
One commonly accepted model, as adapted for Alaska by the Native
American Fish and Wildlife Society, identifies eight levels of comanagement.
This model can be quite helpful in evaluating the desired or appropriate
level of Native control in a particular comanagement agreement.
The sharing of responsibility embodied in the concept of
comanagement can be informal, as when state troopers decline to cite
someone for a violation of a game regulation, thus leaving the matter to a
tribal village council. It can also be formal, through signing a formal
comanagement agreement with the federal and/or state governments."
These formal agreements are sometimes called "comanagement regimes."24
B.

Classifying Comanagement Decisions

In deciding on what an "appropriate" system of comanagement might
be, it is helpful first to evaluate the types of "management" functions that
are involved. Basically, these functions fall into four interrelated categories:
research, regulation, allocation, and enforcement. Among other things,
research includes the gathering of baseline biological data on fish or wildlife
populations, as well as gathering harvest data (numbers, timing, and
methods of harvest). Regulation involves any applicable restrictions on
harvest, such as seasons, bag limits, location, limitations on which fish and
wildlife can be harvested (e.g., no females), etc. Allocation, in turn, refers to

21.

See e.g., Freeman, supra note 15; OSHERENKO, supra note 1; Case, supra note 1.

22.

See OSHERENKO, supra note 1, at 13.

23.

See id.

24.

Id.
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who is allowed to harvest what fish or wildlife-for example, the AEWC
allocates a certain number of whales which may be struck or harvested to
each of the whaling villages in Alaska.25 Finally, enforcement involves
ensuring that the applicable regulations are followed,
These different management functions are interrelated. Research is a key
underlying basis for regulations, since it helps determine such factors as the
number of animals which may be harvested to ensure a healthy population, as
well as the extent to which a regulation may have an unwarranted and
unnecessary impact on hunting customs. In many cases, allocations are put
forth as regulations. And often enforcement considerations may dictate the
form of the regulations themselves. For example, in order to ensure that there
is not an excessive harvest, western game management relies heavily on
individual bag limits, as these are easy to enforce.26
C.

Six Key Questions

Deciding whether to include all or some of these management
function in a comanagement agreement is just one of the many decisions
that need to be made in structuring such agreements. Dalee Sambo
Dorough has identified the six key questions that must be answered in any
comanagement agreement:
The questions of who has management authority, jurisdiction, and
enforcement powers are all necessary to address in a fair, just and
respectful fashion. It is also necessary to identify what species are
covered by the regime and what interests indigenous peoples and
others have in the protection and management of the species. The
period of time that the regime covers should be clearly identified:
when does it take effect and how long will it last? A further important
aspect is the mapping of the territory and boundaries involved, or
essentially where the management regime would be applicable. Also,
the matter of how a co-management regime would actually work
must be addressed: what mechanisms will be put in place, what
regulations or "pertinent laws" will be adopted, and who drafts these
rules and regulations? And, ultimately, the question of why such a
regime is being established must be answered by all parties. This
intent or goal should be stated at the outset of the agreement, and
be the guiding principle of the overall agreement.27

25.

See Freeman, supra note 15, at 144-45.

26.

See OSHERENKO, supra note 1, at 3-4.

27. Dalee Sambo Dorough, Minimum Standards and Fundamental Principles
for 'Comanagement' Regimes with Alaska Natives, 4 (unpublished manuscript on file
with the author).

West s Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

Before turning to the factors involved in each of these questions, one last
point needs to be made. Many different types of agreements have been styled
"comanagement" agreements. These include contracts to gather subsistence
use information," agreements on migratory bird enforcement policy,"
management of the bowhead whale hunt,3" and various complex settlements of
Native land claims in Canada." The word "comanagement" has also taken on an
important symbolic meaning, referring. to the strongly-held desire of Native
tribes and organizations to exert real control over research, regulation,
allocation and enforcement.32 "Comanagement" thus has what might be called a
technical meaning, as when it refers to any of the different levels of power
sharing between Native groups and a governmental entity, and a normative
meaning, as when it refers to a particular level of community authority that is
felt to be the appropriate one. In view of the vast range of possible types and
levels of comanagement agreements, and in order to avoid selecting one
particular norm, this article will use "comanagement" in its technical sense of
power sharing between Native Groups and Government.
IV.

The Goals of a Comanagement Agreement
A.

Choosing Forms of Management and Levels of Control

Determining the goal of the agreement is the first decision to be made in

formulating a comanagement agreement. As noted above, comanagement

28. Section 809 of ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3119, authorizes the federal government to
enter into cooperative agreements with the State of Alaska, Native corporations, and
other appropriate organizations to carry out the purpose of Title VIII of ANILCA. The
federal government has entered into such agreements with several Native organizations,
primarily to carry out harvest monitoring activities, but also to engage efforts as
minimizing conflicts among users of specific game populations. Among the more
successful of the latter agreements is the Qavilnguut Caribou Herd Management System,
a three-part agreement between the FWS, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, and
eighteen Yup'ik Eskimo villages in southwestern Alaska which seeks to resolve
management issues involving the Oavilnguut (or Kilbuck) caribou herd through
consensus by all parties. See infra text accompanying note 50; Spaeder, The Oavilnguut
(Kilbuck) Caribou Herd: An Alaskan Example of Cooperative Management (June 1995)

(unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
29.

See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.

30.

See supra text accompanying note 15.

See e.g., Berkes, Co-Management and the James Bay Agreement, in Co-OPERATIVE
MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL FISHERIES, supra note 1; Nancy C. Doubleday, Co-Management
Provisions of the Inuvalit Final Agreement, in CO-OPERATIVE MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL FISHERIES,
supra note 1.
31.

32.

See e.g., Dorough, supra note 27.

West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. I, Whiter 2008

implicates two distinct sets of factors: the level of community authority and the
specific form of management. A Native tribe or organization considering a
comanagement agreement will need to decide on the forms of management in
which it wants to participate and how much control it desires-or, in many
cases, what it can obtain given the constraints of federal law. Depending upon
the type of activity, the tribe or organization may choose an agreement that
incorporates several of the levels previously discussed.
This can best be illustrated through some examples. First, suppose that a
Native marine mammal commission decides that it is more appropriate for
individual tribes, not the commission itself, to regulate or allocate Native take,
and that the commission's role is most properly one of research and advocacy.
In that case, the comanagement agreement negotiated with a federal agency
might need to address only scientific research protocols, respective roles for
research, and full consultation on proposed government regulatory and
enforcement initiatives. However, the commission may also decide that it
should have principal responsibility for conducting research and for regulating
the conduct of scientists who do research in the communities. In this case, the
commission's comanagement agreement would incorporate several of the eight
levels, notably the higher levels with respect to research and the lower ones with
respect to the federal government's assertion of its authority.
By contrast, a tribe whose members take marine mammals might
decide that it wants to control the activities of its members largely
independent of any government control. More specifically, the tribe might
conclude that it should have principal responsibility over writing the
regulations, allocating the harvest in the event that, tn allocation would be
needed, and enforcing the regulations. The comanagement agreement it
would negotiate might focus on these three elements of management,
calling for a high level of community authority.
The AEWC represents yet another example of how the overall framework
issues might be addressed. The AEWC has taken responsibility for all four forms of
management, conducting its own research, developing whaling regulations,
allocating the whale quota among the villages, and enforcing both the quota and
the regulations. The research is conducted both independently and in partnership
with whale biologists from other organizations; regulation and allocation among
the villages is almost entirely the responsibility of the AEWC and its members;
and the AEWC has principal responsibility for enforcement, with the federal
government providing a backup role. On the other hand, with respect to setting
the overall quota, the AEWC merely has an opportunity to participate in the
meetings of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) as a member of the U.S.
delegation-it has no real authority over the IWC's deliberations or decisions.33

33. See generally Freeman, supra note 15; Huntington, The Alaska Eskimo Whaling
Commission: Effective Local Management of a Subsistence Resource, in CO-OPERATIVE
MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL FISHERIES,

supra note 1.
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B.

Political and Legal Constraints

As this last example illustrates, the extent of community control by a
Native tribes or organizations is governed to a large degree by the western
legal and political framework. With respect to marine mammals, Native tribes
and organizations have a considerable amount of flexibility, since, as noted
above, Native take cannot be regulated or allocated by the federal government
unless a species is found to be depleted. By contrast, spring and summer
hunting of migratory birds currently is flatly prohibited by the treaty with
Canada-at least until the Senate ratifies the new Protocol Amendment to
that treaty. Native groups wishing to pursue comanagement agreements on
migratory birds therefore have had to focus on enforcement, as has been done
quite successfully with the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta Goose Management Plan.
That agreement essentially represents a sharing of authority over enforcement
of migratory bird hunting, under which the federal government enforces a set
of agreed upon bans of hunting and/or egging of four species of birds while
Native groups regulate hunting of all other species.' 4
The western legal and political framework is particularly important to
consider in the context of tribal control over fishing and hunting of territorial
mammals. Some Alaska Native activists believe that comanagement can
only be properly implemented in this context if full authority and
jurisdiction are vested in the tribes.3 At present, however, the federal and
state governments have claimed virtually complete jurisdiction over tribal
hunting and fishing, leaving little room for tribal control.3" This suggests that
achieving full authority for the tribes will require a substantial change in
federal policy, and perhaps in federal law. Tribes and Native organizations

34.

See supra text accompanying note 18.

35.

See e.g., Dorough, supra note 27.

36.

Tribes generally can have jurisdiction over fish and wildlife only to the extent

that that jurisdiction is preserved by a federal statute or treaty or is exercised within
"Indian country." See generally, FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 441-70
(1982). The U.S. Court of Appeals recently ruled in State of Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats
Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), that the
lands comprising the former Venetie Reserve are Indian country. The language of the
court's opinion suggests that other lands owned by Alaska Native village corporations
organized pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act also may be Indian
country. Whether such recognition of Indian country will mean tribal jurisdiction over
fish and wildlife is not clear at this point. The State of Alaska has appealed the Venetie
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court-the State has consistently strongly advocated
against tribal jurisdiction over fish and wildlife. In June 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 117 S. Ct. 2478
(1997). The case is schedule to be argued in December, 1997.
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will need to address whether they can or will accept a comanagement
agreement that embodies anything less than full tribal control. In
answering this question, tribes and Native organizations might want to
consider the following:
I.

Whether full tribal control is necessary to meet their needs in a
particular comanagement agreement.

2.

Whether full tribal control must be an immediate objective that
must be attained before beginning the process of negotiating
comanagement agreements, or whether this is a long-term goal
to be attained in part through negotiating comanagement
agreements embodying ever-increasing amounts of community
authority.

In summary, in deciding on the goal of a comanagement agreement, it is
important to determine the type or types of management that will be covered
and the level of community control that is desired. In making this decision, the
legal and political context will govern, to some extent, what is possible-but the
negotiations themselves may well push the government authorities into
agreeing to something they initially thought was not possible.
V.

Who Has Comanagement Authority

Who are the appropriate Native parties to be entering into
comanagement agreements with the federal and/or state governments?
Several Alaska Native marine mammal commissions have signed
memoranda of agreement with the federal government;37 the Waterfowl
Conservation Commission (WCC) is the principal Native signatory to the
Goose Management Plan, and several Native non-profit organizations have
signed agreements with the Fish and Wildlife Service pursuant to section
809 of ANILCA. Other Native organizations are also looking into
comanagement, and there is undoubtedly, considerable interest among
tribes in developing comanagement agreements with the government on
regulation of hunting and fishing by their members.
Obviously, there is some potential for overlap in these agreements. For
example, a marine mammal commission might be interested in signing a
comanagement agreement that gives it considerable authority to regulate
hunting, at the same time that individual tribes are approaching the
government for the same purpose. Accordingly, there is a need for careful
coordination and communication among the various interested parties, so that

37. These include the AEWC, the Eskimo Walrus Commission, and the Alaska
Sea Otter Commission.
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the appropriate entities assume proper roles. In particular, there may well need
to be some agreement or framework established to set out a process for
determining which entity should take on which management tasks with respect
to a particular area or a particular species, be it a tribe, a Native non-profit or
other regional group, or a Native commission.38 This will be particularly
important with respect to comanagement agreements entered into under
section 119 of the MMPA,39 which may be a source of funding for implementing
comanagement agreements 4 -since
the funding will be limited, careful
coordination will be needed to avoid competition and duplicative efforts.
V1.

The Species Covered by a Comanagement Agreement

To date, most comanagement agreements between Native groups and
the federal government have concerned either a particular species, such as
walrus, bowhead whales, and sea otters, or a particular issue, such as
migratory bird hunting or subsistence uses on federal lands. This trend is
likely to continue with respect to marine mammal commissions, the WCC,
and the section 809 agreements. But again, there is a strong potential for
overlap among the different possible comanagement agreements.
For example, a tribe might want to enter into a comanagement
agreement covering hunting of all species used by its members, including
marine mammals, birds, and terrestrial mammals. This obviously creates the
possibility of overlap and perhaps even inconsistency with agreements
signed by other entities, such as an agreement concerning walrus and the
Goose Management Plan. In addition, the species used by the tribe's
members often may be used by members of other tribes, which will
require coordination with the other tribes to ensure that there are no
conflicts or inconsistencies.
As these considerations indicate; any framework for comanagement
agreements also will need to cover a process for communication and
coordination as to the species covered by a particular agreement. This,
again, will be particularly important in the section 119 process, since both

38. As relevant to this article, there are three general types of Native
organizations in Alaska. The first is the federally recognized tribes. A second type
consists of what are generally termed the "non-profits-these are tribal
organizations, organized on a regional level, which are empowered by their member
tribes to deliver services (such as health, realty, and advocacy) to the member tribes
and tribal members. Finally, Native commissions have been created to advocate of behalf
of the users of particular species of animals, mostly marine mammals-the Alaska
Eskimo Whaling Commission is among the more well known of these organizations.
39.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1388 (1994).

40. Sectopm 119 of the MMPA authorizes up to $2.5 million to be appropriated by
Congress to develop comanagement agreements with Native organizations. See id.
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tribes and commissions may be interested in developing comanagement
agreements for the same species.
VII. The Time Period of an Agreement
In general, most comanagement agreements either contain a specific
expiration date, with an opportunity for renewal, or are designed to last
unless and until one of the parties formally notifies the others that it wishes
to terminate the agreement. The advantage of a specific term for the
agreement is that it forces the parties to revisit the agreement periodically,
so that they can change it to accommodate altered or different
circumstances. This has been of great benefit in the Goose Management
Plan, since conditions have changed since the first Plan was adopted. 4
On the other hand, being forced to renegotiate can impose burdens
and expense on the parties which can be needless if there is no reason to
change the agreement on a regular basis. Avoiding this cost is probably the
principal advantage to making the agreement remain in effect unless and
until it is terminated. Of course, if the latter type of agreement cannot be
amended, then it can lack the necessary flexibility to adapt if circumstances
do change. This can easily be avoided, however, by including a provision in
the agreement that it can be modified by the parties if necessary.
It probably is easiest not to include a specific term in a comanagement
agreement, but to provide that the agreement can be modified by mutual
consent of the parties. Where circumstances-such as levels of funding or
populations of particular species-do change on a yearly basis, it may make
sense either to include a specific term or to make specific parts of the
agreement subject to renegotiation each year.
VIII. Where a Comanagement Agreement Could Apply
In most cases, the geographic area covered by a comanagement
agreement will be quite important. This is clearest with respect to
comanagement agreements with tribes, since they can only exert authority
within their territorial jurisdiction. This, of course, will require the federal
government to recognize tribal jurisdiction if tribes are fully to manage hunting
and fishing in a manner consistent with the tribe's inherent authorities.
Other comanagement agreements which would need to define the relevant
geographic territory include agreements on research and on collecting subsistence
use data in particular areas, agreements on enforcement of migratory bird hunting,
and any regional management plans for marine mammals. On the other hand,
some agreements may not need a territorial component. One example would be a

41.
Interview with Calvin Simeon, Natural Resources Director, Association of
Village Council Presidents, in Bethel, Alaska.
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marine mammal agreement pertaining to research and communication with respect
to a particular species, since the agreement would pertain to any and all activities
regarding the species, regardless of where they occur.
There may, again, be a possibility for overlap in comanagement
territories. For example, a tribe and a regional organization might seek a
comanagement agreement on how research may be conducted in the tribe's
area. As a general matter, however, this territorial issue should ordinarily
coincide with the issue of who should enter into the agreement, and so can
be resolved at the same time.
IX.

The Content of a Comanagement Agreement

As discussed above, existing comanagement agreements address a
variety of topics with varying levels of Native control over decision-making.
Underlying the choices that have been made in each agreement are
decisions as to each of the five issues addressed above. Needless to say,
these decisions only set the framework for what the agreement actually will
achieve. There are, in turn, at least three sets, of considerations involved in
addressing this issue: the management functions of research, regulation,
allocation, and enforcement; a dispute resolution mechanism; and funding.
A.

Management Functions

The relevant factors involved in designing a comanagement agreement
can be evaluated in part by reference to each of the four functions implicit in
management of fish and wildlife resources: research, regulation, allocation,
and enforcement.
I.

Research

The Native community is in the process of developing research protocols
to guide western scientists in their work in Native villages.42 of equal
importance are efforts presently underway to develop systems for integrating
the traditional knowledge of Native peoples into western scientific research and
into the decision-making process.43 A third key factor involves how federal and

42. For example, the Alaska Federation of Natives developed a set of protocols to guide
research in any Native community, under which researchers are asked to communicate with
the community before conducting their research, to make it clear just what the object of the
research is, to work with the community to avoid any unintended violations of local culture
rules, and to inform the community of the results of the research.
43. Alaska Natives have created an Alaska Native Science Commission, which
has as a primary goal the collection and integration of Native knowledge into the
decision making process.
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state agencies use the information they are provided, be it through western
science or by individual Natives and Native tribes and organizations. This is
especially true with respect to subsistence uses of fish and wildlife-all too
often, Natives have found that the information they provide is used against
them. 4 Once the basic decisions are made as to how to approach each of these
factors, they can be worked into a framework that all future comanagement
agreements focusing on research can use.
2.

Regulation

Regulation often proves to be among the most intractable issues, since
both the state and federal governments are particularly jealous of their
authority to regulate uses of fish and wildlife for conservation purposes. They
also tend to bring a bias against forms of management that differ from what
they are taught in fisheries and wildlife management courses, which generally
are based on a sport or commercial use framework.4" In the United States, this
has generally translated to a "we manage and you cooperate" sort of
arrangement, with relatively little power granted to Native tribes or
organizations.46 The Canadians have (at least in theory) been more open to
fuller indigenous participation, structuring most of their land claims to
include management boards composed of equal numbers of Natives and
government officials. These boards operate by consensus, but their decisions
are subject to review, modification, and even reversal by the appropriate
Canadian minister. Apparently, the minister rarely changes or rejects what a
board recommends, precisely because they are conducted by consensus.47
In view of these constraints, Native tribes and organizations will likely
be faced with making the hard decision as to how much regulatory authority
to press for in comanagement negotiations. While this decision will no
doubt need to be made for any of the management functions, it is
particularly important in the context of regulation, since this is where the
constraints and the disputes can be the strongest. There are a variety of
possibilities in this respect. The Native community could, as a whole, arrive
at a level of community authority that it feels is necessary in order to sign
any comanagement agreement, or it could leave the decision as to the
appropriate level of involvement to each individual negotiation. The Native
community could also identify particular standards as goals, rather than
minimum guarantees, that must underlie any agreement.

44.

KOTZEBUE FISH AND GAME ADVISORY COMMIT7EE, REGULATION REVIEW:

OF THE GAME REGULATIONS AFFECTING NORTHWEST ALASKA (Oct.
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See Berkes, supra note 31.

GAME ADVISORY COMMITEE,

1986).
supra

note

44.

A

REVIEW

West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

3.

Allocation

Allocation issues arise in two contexts: allocation within the Native
community, and allocation between Native and non-Native users. Allocation
between Native and non-Native users raises the same sets of concerns as
regulation of fishing and hunting. There obviously are strong interests
involved here, most notably sport hunters, sport fishermen, and commercial
fishermen, but also "nonconsumptive users" who value looking at wildlife or
just appreciate knowing the wildlife is there. Representatives of these
groups may want some role in deciding allocations. The role of other users
will have to be factored into both a comanagement agreement and any
framework on comanagement that the Native community devises.
There seems to be no reason that government agencies outside of the
tribe should get involved in the internal issue of how to allocate fish and
wildlife within a Native community or among different Native communities.
The key question for outside managers is the total overall Native harvest,
not who takes the animal. This type of allocation is best left to the Native
entity or entities.
4.

Enforcement

Federal and state agencies also tend to be quite intent on preserving
their overall authority to enforce federal and state law. On the other hand,
they have been willing essentially to delegate that authority in limited
contexts, most importantly to the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission with
respect to whaling, and, to a lesser extent, to tribes in the Yukon-Kuskokwim
Delta with regard to migratory birds.48 The approach used in these contexts,
whereby the Native entity takes on initial and principal enforcement
authority, with the government serving a backup role in the event that
Native enforcement is not successful, would seem to be one that should
work in most areas, and so perhaps could be an element of the framework
on comanagement developed by the Native community.

B.

Dispute Resolution

The very concept of comanagement revolves centrally around the
notion that responsibility over management must be shared in some fashion
between indigenous people and the federal and/or state governments. The
manner in which that responsibility is shared should, for the most part, itself
provide the principal mechanism by which disputes between Native users
and government managers are resolved. For example, the Goose

48.

See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
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Management Plan effectively resolved a dispute over enforcement of the
Migratory Bird Treaty by identifying the species that Natives would hunt
without federal interference and those that Natives agreed not to hunt.
On the other hand, there may well be many occasions where disputes
will arise in implementing a comanagement agreement. For example, Native
users may have different ideas regarding the health of a wildlife population
from the federal biologists, and so would push for different allowable levels
of harvest. To the extent that a comanagement agreement does not place
sole authority over these decisions with either Native users or the
government, there will need to be some mechanism that resolves such
disputes. In Canada, for example, the management boards discuss these
issues and attempt to arrive at a consensus,

49

This is also the case with

respect to the Kilbuck Caribou herd on the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta, where
caribou hunters and the government arrive at a consensus position each
year on how many caribou may be harvested, and present that position to
the relevant state and federal agencies for approval."°
In both of these cases, the consensus position is subject to final review
and approval by the government. Alaska Natives may want to consider
whether this is an appropriate approach for all comanagement agreements,
whether they want to push for a stronger role in this respect, or whether they
want to leave the matter for negotiation in each comanagement agreement.
It seems clear, in any event, that any dispute resolution mechanism will
require two elements: a process of meeting between the various sides in
order to attempt to resolve the matter, and some agreed-upon entity with
final decision making authority.
C.

Funding

It is obvious that there can be no effective comanagement if Nat ive
tribes or organizations lack the funding and/or trained personnel to
implement a comanagement agreement. Adequate funding has been a key
reason behind the effectiveness of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling
Commission,5' and it has enabled several Native non-profits to engage in
their own research and data collection on Native subsistence uses in their
area. 2 Thus, a central element of any comanagement negotiation will
involve how the Native tribe or organization will be able to pay for its work.
Funding mechanisms can be built directly into the comanagement
agreement, as is contemplated by section 119 of the MMPA; they can be
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See Berkes, supra note 31.
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See Spaeder, supra text 28.

51.

See Case, supra note 1.

52. Interview with Calvin Simeon, supra note 41; interview with George Yaska,
Wildlife and Parks Director, Tanana Chiefs Conference, in Fairbanks, Alaska.
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guaranteed through a contract with a federal agency; or they can be provided
independently, as is the case with the Whaling Commission. The Native
community may wish to address whether to insist, in a comanagement
framework, that funding be part of any agreement, or whether to leave this
to the individual negotiations.
One issue that a framework usually must address is resolving
competition for limited funding. This is likely to arise in the implementation
of section 119 of the MMPA. Funding under this section is key to ensuring
the success of any comanagement agreements, signed pursuant to this
section, yet only a limited amount of money is likely to be available. This
means that many Native tribes and organizations may be competing for the
same funds. In order to avoid disputes, and more importantly, to avoid
federal government priorities rather than the Native community's priorities
controlling the funding decisions, it is important that the Native community
arrive at its own framework for deciding how to allocate these limited funds.
X.

Summary and Conclusion

The factors discussed in this paper apply to any comanagement
agreements that are signed with federal and/or state agencies and to any
overall framework designed by the Native community to guide Native tribes
and organizations in their negotiations. In many cases, such as deciding
which types of management functions to include in the agreement and
which entity is the most appropriate one to participate, the decision
probably will have to be made on a case-by-case basis respecting a
particular comanagement agreement, through discussions among the
different Native entities involved. In other cases, an overall framework can
serve as an effective way to protect the Native community's interests as the
comanagement process moves forward.
The following issues appear to be the most likely candidates for
inclusion or discussion in an overall comanagement framework:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

Research protocols.
Mechanisms for inclusion of traditional Native knowledge in
decision-making.
Mechanisms for assisting Native organizations in discussing
allocation of overlapping authority over a particular species or
topic (e.g., tribal versus regional authority over hunting
marine mammals.)
The extent to which principal authority for comanagement should
be vested in tribes.
Standards for deciding the minimum levels of community authority
acceptable to the Native community in different contexts.
The manner in which enforcement authority should be shared,
e.g., an insistence on the Whaling Commission model.

West &Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

7.
8.

Standards for dispute resolution mechanisms.
Assurances of adequate funding for comanagement activities on
an ongoing basis, and mechanisms for preventing competition
for limited funds.

Comanagement is potentially a very powerful tool for managing fish
and wildlife in Alaska in a manner that both conserves the species and
meets the needs of the Native community. While they are becoming more
receptive to the idea, federal and state agencies remain suspicious of the
concept and jealous of their authority and funding. This gap can be bridged,
and comanagement can be advanced, through the development of a
framework for comanagement agreements, for this will assist Native tribes
and organizations in formulating what they believe to be an acceptable
comanagement regime, as well as federal and state agencies in
understanding the real value of these regimes.

